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A WORK OF HEART: A PROPOSAL FOR A
REVISION OF THE VISUAL ARTISTS RIGHTS
ACT OF 1990 TO BRING THE UNITED STATES
CLOSER TO INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
Rebecca Stuart*
How important are the visual arts in our society? I feel
strongly that the visual arts are of vast and incalculable
importance. Of course, I could be prejudiced. I am a visual
art.
-Kermit the Frog, Muppet1
There are three forms of visual art: painting is art to look
at, sculpture is art you can walk around, and architecture is
art you can walk through.
-Dan Rice, Artist2
I. INTRODUCTION
Roslyn Mazzilli's "There" is a sculpture located in the
Oakland City Center,3 where people gather daily to eat lunch
and talk.4  Few of these people likely understand the
* Research Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 47; J.D. Candidate, Santa
Clara University School of Law; B.S., Business Administration, University of
Southern California.
1. Dion Archibald, Art Quotes,
http://www.dionarchibald.com/ArtQuotes/art.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2007).
2. Thinkexist.com, Dan Rice Quotes,
http://thinkexist.com/quotation/there are-three_
forms-of visual-art-paintingis/158072.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2007).
3. Roslyn Mazzilli, Artist Statement,
http://www.roslynmazzilli.com/artiststatement.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2007).
Artist Roslyn Mazzilli created the sculpture "There" at the request of the City of
Oakland. Id.
4. Id. The Oakland City Center, located in downtown Oakland, serves over
50,000 people. Oakland City Center, Visitors,
http://www.oaklandcitycenter.comvisitors.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2007). Its
proximity to the downtown business district, county and city offices, and city
hall make it a prime location for visitors. See id. With a plethora of stores and
restaurants, it is a popular spot for lunchtime dining and shopping. Id. The
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emotions that the sculpture is intended to evoke, or the
inspiration behind its creation.' Perhaps more importantly,
they do not have to. The beauty of art is that it crosses all
boundaries and levels of education, socioeconomic statuses,
and cultural backgrounds. It provides something that every
man, woman, and child can appreciate in their own individual
way.
But what if "There" was destroyed? What if it was cut
into a number of pieces and displayed in multiple locations?
Should the artist be denied protection for her work simply
because it had already been sold to the City of Oakland, or
should she be entitled to some form of protection based on the
art being her work?
The American legal system places a lower value on the
works of visual artists than foreign legal systems by failing to
provide protection for the moral rights of all artists.6 In 1988,
the United States finally joined the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Berne
Convention),7 which was initially drafted to expand copyright
protection beyond the nation where the copyright was
granted.8  While the United States joined with a few
City Center also hosts events such as band performances, cultural celebrations,
and comedy shows. Id. The entire plaza is filled with fountains, artistic
walkways, and sculptures. Id.
5. See Mazzilli, supra note 3 ("I try to evoke an appropriateness of scale,
and a life-affirming emotional response. For example, my sculpture 'There' in
the city center of downtown Oakland in California answered the criticism by
writer Gertrude Stein who said 'there is no there, there.'. . . My sculptures are
inspired by nature, by her images and endless palette of color. Like natural
forms, my sculptures are rhythmically alive, gracefully poised, and seemingly
kinetic: like the moment a bird spreads its wings into flight, like petals of a
flower fanned to form a blossom.").
6. See infra Part IV.C. Moral rights historically protected an artist's work
from being destroyed or mutilated, or altered in any way. See infra Part II.A.1.
The term "moral rights" refers to the inherent right of an artist to protect the
integrity of his work. Id. For a full definition of moral rights in current United
States legislation, see infra Part II.C.
7. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
opened for signature Sept. 9, 1886, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (last
revised July 24, 1971) [hereinafter Berne Convention], reprinted in WORLD
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, GUIDE TO THE BERNE CONVENTION
FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS (PARIS ACT, 1971)
(1978), available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/treaties/berne/overview.html
(last visited Feb. 10, 2007).
8. See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568,
102 Stat. 2853 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. (2000)).
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limitations,9 the Berne Convention brought the United States
closer to complying with the international standards of
protection for artists. 1° Prior to the United States' signing of
this treaty, artists generally had no recourse with respect to
the fate of their work after it was sold, as copyright laws
protected the work only from economic exploitation. 1
Following the implementation of the Berne Convention, 12
the United States passed its own legislation dealing with
moral rights, the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (VARA).13
While facially inclusive of the moral rights of visual artists,
the legislation has not proven effective in actually protecting
them.14 American case law demonstrates how little weight
has been given to VARA, and proves that there are still many
aspects of moral rights that it does not protect.1" By looking
at international moral rights legislation as a guide, America
can amend VARA to bring it into full compliance with the
Berne Convention and international standards, thus allowing
more complete moral rights protection for American artists.16
This comment will first provide a background of the
protection of visual artists by analyzing the Berne
Convention. 7  The comment will then outline America's
moral rights legislation, as codified by VARA. i s Part III will
9. 134 CONG. REC. S14553 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1988) (statement of Sen.
DeConcini). Congress ensured that Article 6 bis would not be enforced against a
member nation that did not fully implement this provision of the Berne
Convention. See id.
10. See infra Parts IV.C-E.
11. Linda J. Lacey, Of Bread and Roses and Copyright, 1989 DUKE L.J.
1532, 1539 (1989). In contrast to this American theory of protecting works only
from economic poaching, the moral rights theory, as it originated in Europe,
protects an artist's personal rights in his or her property. Id. at 1548-49. Moral
rights remain with an artist even after their work is sold. Id. The droits
moraux, or moral rights, which originated in France, stands for the proposition
that artistic creations are part of the artist's personality, and that status as
personal property gives rise to the need for a higher level of protection of the
property than mere economic remedies. Id. For more on this theoretical
dichotomy, see infra Part IV.D.
12. See Berne Convention Implementation Act § 3.
13. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5128
(codified in 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2000)).
14. See infra Part IV.A.
15. See infra Part V.A.
16. See infra Part V.
17. See infra Part II.A.
18. See infra Part II.C.
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identify the legal problem with the current VARA statute.1 9
A discussion of case law in Part IV will demonstrate the
inadequate protection given to the moral rights of artists, and
the difference between American copyright and moral rights
legislation as compared to the international community.2 °
Finally, Part V will propose a better standard for America to
use in defining and protecting the moral rights of artists,
using international moral rights legislation as a guide.21
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Berne Convention
In 1988, the United States joined the Berne Convention22
when President Reagan signed the Berne Convention
Implementation Act (BCIA) into law.2 3 The United States'
decision to finally join the Berne Convention based largely on
international copyright issues,24 including the desire to fight
copyright piracy abroad and increase the international
copyright protection afforded to American copyright holders.2"
1. Article 6 bis
Article 6 bis of the Berne convention provides moral
rights protection to the author of any literary or artistic
work.26 Specifically, Article 6 bis provides that "the author
19. See infra Part III.
20. See infra Part IV.
21. See infra Part V.
22. See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568,
§ 3, 102 Stat. 2853 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.
(2000)).
23. Id.; see also David M. Spector, Implications of United States Adherence
to the Berne Convention, 17 AIPLA Q.J. 100, 102 (1989).
24. Spector, supra note 23, at 105-06.
25. See id. The main purpose of the Berne Convention was to extend the
protection of copyrighted materials beyond the country where the copyright was
issued. See generally Berne Convention, supra note 7, at art. 1. Prior to this
treaty, a British author who registered the copyright for his book in England
would be able to prevent that work from being copied within England, but it
could freely be copied in other countries, such as France, without any recourse.
The European community decided to address this situation, and wrote the
Berne Convention to act as the instrument of enforcement. The United States
finally decided to join the Berne Convention when it became apparent that
American artists were being subjected to this dichotomy without adequate
protection abroad. See infra Part II.A-B.
26. Berne Convention, supra note 7, at art. 6 bis(1).
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shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to
object to any distortion, mutilation, or other modification of,
or other derogatory action in relation to said work which will
be prejudicial to his reputation."27 The article further states
that these rights shall continue after the death of the author
for the remaining period of copyright protection, depending on
the country where protection was granted.28
Article 6 bis was originally written to codify the moral
rights protection given to artists in the international
community, but it represents only a minimalist approach to
granting that protection.29  Historically, moral rights
legislation protected not only the rights of attribution and
integrity,30  as covered by Article 6 bis, but also the
divulgation right 31 and the right to repent or withdraw. 2
Although the rights of divulgation and withdrawal are not
included in the Berne Convention, they are protected by
many countries.33
At the time of the BCIA, the United States did not have
any moral rights protection as required by Article 6 bis. 4
Despite this lack of express moral rights legislation, Congress
stressed that U. S. law already complied with Article 6 bis
through various provisions of existing state and federal
laws. 35 The legislators stated that the United States should
not be required to follow Article 6 bis precisely as outlined in
the Berne Convention because of existing laws that addressed
27. Id.
28. Id. at art. 6 bis(2).
29. Adolf Dietz, The Moral Right of the Author: Moral Rights and the Civil
Law Countries, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 199, 200 (1995).
30. See infra Part II.C.1.
31. See Dietz, supra note 29, at 204. The divulgation right reserves in the
author the sole decision of when, how and where to release his work to the
public. See infra Part IV.E.
32. See Dietz, supra note 29, at 204. The right to repent or withdraw allows
the author to withdraw his work from the public sphere whenever he or she
chooses. See infra Part IV.E.
33. Dietz, supra note 29, at 203.
34. See infra Part II.B.
35. S. REP. No. 100-352, at 9 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3706, 3714-15 ("This existing U.S. law includes various provisions of the
Copyright Act and Lanham Act, various state statutes, and common law
principles such as libel, defamation, misrepresentation, and unfair competition,
which have been applied by courts to redress authors' invocation of the right to
claim authorship or the right to object to distortion."); see also 134 CONG. REC.
S14553 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1988) (statement of Sen. DeConcini).
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moral rights issues in the United States." Despite claims
that protection for moral rights already existed,37 others in
Congress argued that the existing laws were in fact
inadequate. 8 Nevertheless, Congress determined that the
available laws provided just enough protection to enable the
United States to comply with the Berne Convention without
implementing Article 6 bis.39
a. The Lanham Act
United States lawmakers cited section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act40 as one example of the protection given to moral
rights under American law.4 Section 43(a) was enacted to
codify the common law trademark doctrine of "passing off,"
the representation of one person's goods or works as those of
another.42  The Lanham Act was meant to protect both
producers and consumers,43 yet the courts' interpretation of it
36. H.R. REP. No. 100-609, at 38-39 (1988). The Committee on the
Judiciary of the House of Representatives stated that: "[E]xisting law is
sufficient to enable the United States to adhere to the Berne Convention, the
implementing legislation is completely neutral on the issue of whether and how
protection of the rights of paternity and integrity should develop in the future."
Id.
37. See id.
38. 134 CONG. REC. S14558 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1988) (statement of Sen.
Hatch). The Senator stated: "[Wihile existing U.S. law satisfies U.S. obligations
under article 6 bis of Berne, our judicial system has constantly rejected causes
of action denominated as 'moral rights' or arising under the moral rights
doctrine." Id. The Senator's statement clearly shows that the United States did
not in fact have any moral rights protection, but that there was enough
generalized protection for the United States to comply with the Berne
Convention without complying with Article 6 bis. See id.
39. See 134 CONG. REC. S14553 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1988) (statement of Sen.
DeConcini). Even though Congress stated that the current law was sufficient
for compliance with the Berne Convention, the United States refused to join the
Berne Convention until it was assured that Article 6 his would not be enforced
against a mer.ber nation which did not fully implement it. Id. This
requirement can be seen as an implied admission that Congress knew the
current laws were not sufficient.
40. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000).
41. See supra note 36. The Lanham Act was one of the existing American
laws used by legislators to show there was no need to implement Article 6 bis.
See supra text accompanying notes 40-53.
42. See Lori H. Freedman, Reverse Passing Off. A Great Deal of Confusion,
83 TRADEMARK REP. 305, 307 (1993) (discussing congressional intent underlying
§ 43(a)); see also Larkin Group, Inc., v. Aquatic Design Consultants, Inc., 323 F.
Supp. 2d 1121, 1121 (D. Kan. 2004) (explaining that passing off occurs when
someone tries to claim another person's goods as his or her own).
43. See Freedman, supra note 42, at 307.
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led to the conclusion that the Lanham Act could function as
"the one federal enactment capable of safeguarding the right
of attribution. 
44
In Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Companies,45 the
Second Circuit firmly recognized an artist's right to integrity
in his or her work through a Lanham Act analysis. 46  The
plaintiffs were ultimately successful with their cause of action
under the Lanham Act, allowing the court to protect the work
in question, a television series.4 ' Although the Lanham Act is
a trademark statute, it was "invoked to prevent
misrepresentations that may injure plaintiffs business or
personal reputation, even where no registered trademark is
concerned."4' The court reasoned that when a plaintiff alleges
that the defendant has presented a distorted version of his or
her work to the public, he or she actually seeks "to redress the
very rights sought to be protected under the Lanham Act."49
The holding of this case likely caused Congress to believe that
the Lanham Act protected the moral rights of artists, which
led to the suggestion that America was in compliance with
the Berne Convention.
Years later, the Supreme Court distinctly rejected the
idea that the Lanham Act provides moral rights protection.
In Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.,° the
Court clarified that the Lanham Act does not provide
protection for the right of attribution,51 which includes the
right of an artist to claim authorship of his or her work,
among other rights.52 This decision raises the question of
44. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Attribution Right in the United States:
Caught in the Crossfire Between Copyright and Section 43(a), 77 WASH. L. REV.
985, 988 (2002).
45. Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976); see also infra
Part II.B.
46. See Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 24-26.
47. Id. at 24-25.
48. Id. at 24.
49. Id. at 24-25.
50. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
51. Id. at 33 (clarifying that once a copyright expires, the right to copy is
with the public). See generally Stacey L. Garrett, No Need to Search the Nile:
The Supreme Court Clarifies the Use of Public Domain Works in Dastar v.
Twentieth Century Fox, 2003 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POLY 573, 577 (2003)
(explaining that the essence of the Dastar opinion is that public domain
materials may be used without attribution).
52. See infra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
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whether the United States was ever compliant with the Berne
Convention, since Congress cited the Lanham Act as an
example of the protection afforded moral rights at the time of
the BCIA. 3
B. Moral Rights Protection in the United States Before VARA
Contrary to the statements made by Congress, 54 courts
have historically been reluctant to protect artists' moral
rights in the United States, based largely on the historically
utilitarian view that copyrights only protect economic
interests.55 Until VARA was passed in 1990, there was no
real legal protection for the moral rights of artists. Thus,
artists attempted to use various causes of action 56 -
defamation, unfair competition, breach of contract, and
violations of the Lanham Act-in an effort to recover damages
for the destruction or mutilation of their work. Artists have
often turned to other causes of action based in copyright law,
but when an artist has not obtained a registered copyright in
his or her work, it becomes more difficult to succeed at trial.5"
Case law demonstrates the lack of protection artists were
given in the United States prior to the implementation of
53. See Supreme Court Rules that Distributor of Video of Edited Version of
Public Domain Television Series Did Not Violate Lanham Act by Failing to
Credit Twentieth Century Fox as Series' Creator, ENT. L. REP., June 2003, at 1
(suggesting that the United States may be in violation of the Berne Convention
following the Dastar decision).
54. See supra note 35.
55. See infra Part IV.C.
56. Timothy M. Casey, Note, The Visual Artists Rights Act, 14 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 85, 91-95 (1991). Artists who believe their claim will fail
under VARA pursue causes of action drawn from various sources, including
other copyright causes of action, state causes of action, and causes of action
found in other intellectual property areas, like trademark law, to pursue their
claims. Id. Copyright law only provides economic remedies, and does not in
itself protect moral rights. Id. at 91. Other areas of law may each provide a
remedy for a particular portion of an artist's loss, but no legal theory in and of
itself protects an artist's moral rights. Id. at 91-95.
57. See id.
58. An artist obtains a copyright in a work as soon as the work is created
and fixed in a tangible form. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000). Under the current
copyright laws in the United States, the copyright is automatic. See 17 U.S.C.
§§ 409-412 (describing the method for obtaining copyright registration, and the
remedies which cannot be collected from an infringer unless the copyright has
been registered). However, an artist may not sue under a theory of copyright
violation unless he or she has registered the copyright with the Copyright
Office. See id.
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VARA. In 1947, the Seventh Circuit heard Vargas v. Esquire,
a case involving an artist's claim that a magazine used his
drawings without his permission in violation of his moral
rights.5 9 The court rejected the artist's claim that his art was
protected under U. S. law, stating: 'What plaintiff in reality
seeks is a change in the law in this country to conform to that
of certain other countries. We need not stop to inquire
whether such a change, if desirable, is a matter for the
legislative or judicial branch of the government. ''60 Two years
later, in Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church,61 a New York
court held that an artist had no recourse against a church
that painted over the plaintiffs artwork, finding that once a
work is sold, it is unconditionally the property of the
purchaser.6 2 The court used this reasoning to deny any
protection to the artist.63
The leading pre-VARA moral rights case, Gilliam, was
brought by the creators of Monty Python television episodes
that were edited for content and time to air in the United
States.64  The plaintiffs were ultimately successful, and
secured a ruling protecting the integrity of their work6"
because they still owned the copyright to the shows.66 The
Second Circuit held that the defendant television station
could produce derivative works, or separately copyrightable
works based on a pre-existing product, but that the works
presented at trial did not qualify as derivative.67 The court
concluded that "unauthorized editing of the underlying work.
would constitute an infringement of the copyright in that
59. Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d 522 (7th Cir. 1947).
60. Id. at 526. The court demonstrated its attitude towards moral rights by
stating: "These so-called 'moral rights,' so we are informed, are recognized by
the civil law of certain foreign countries." Id.
61. Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church, 89 N.Y.S. 2d 813, 815 (Sup. Ct.
1949). The artist sought specific performance, hoping either that the church
would remove the obliterating paint on the wall, or alternatively, that he be
allowed to remove the entire fresco at the church's expense. Id.
62. Id. at 819.
63. Id.
64. Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
65. See id. at 25.
66. Id. at 17.
67. Id. at 20. Examples of derivative works include "a translation,, musical
arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound
recording, art reproduction, abridgement, condensation, or any other form in
which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
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work similar to any other use of a work that exceeded the
license granted by the proprietor of the copyright."" If the
defendant received permission from the copyright owner to
produce derivative works, it still would not have been
permitted to change the original work.69
C. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990
While some efforts were made in Congress to protect an
artist's moral rights before and after the adoption of the
Berne Convention, 70 no real measures were adopted until
1990, when VARA was passed.71  VARA is generally
recognized as a big step towards the protection of artists'
moral rights in the United States, though it does not fully
comply with the Berne Convention by encompassing all
literary and artistic works as required by Article 6 bis.72
VARA covers only works of "visual art,"7 3 yet many works
that are visual but not considered fine art are excluded from
protection. 4 Also excluded from protection are works made
68. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 21.
69. 17 U.S.C. § 103 (2000).
70. H.R. REP. No. 101-514, at 8 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6915, 6918. (noting that bills attempting to protect artists' moral rights date
back to 1979). The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1989 was introduced by Senator
Kennedy and Representative Kastenmeier. Id. at 5-6, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6915-16.
71. See Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat.
5128 (codified in 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2000)).
72. See Edward J. Damich, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: Toward a
Federal System of Moral Rights Protection for Visual Art, 39 CATH. U.L. REV.
945, 998 (1990). For a detailed explanation of Article 6 bis of the Berne
Convention, see infra Part I.A.1.
73. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). A "work of visual art" is defined as:
(1) a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy,
in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and
consecutively numbered by the author, or, in the case of a sculpture, in
multiple cast, carved, or fabricated sculptures of 200 or fewer that are
consecutively numbered by the author and bear the signature or other
identifying mark of the author; or
(2) a still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only,
existing in a single copy that is signed by the author, or in a limited
edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively
numbered by the author.
Id.
74. Id. The statute specifically excludes the following as works of visual art:
(A)(i) any poster, map, globe, chart, technical drawing, diagram,
model, applied art, motion picture or other audiovisual work, book,
magazine, newspaper, periodical, database, electronic information
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for hire and works not subject to copyright protection.75
1. Protection of Attribution and Integrity Rights
VARA protects the moral rights of attribution and
integrity belonging to the author of a work of visual art that
meets the statute's requirements.76 The right of attribution
allows the author to claim authorship of his or her work,77 to
preclude the use of the author's name if he or she did not in
fact create the work,78 and to renounce authorship of a work
that has been distorted, mutilated, or modified in a manner
that would prejudice the author's honor or reputation. 79 The
right of integrity allows the author to prevent the distortion,
mutilation, or other modification of his or her work if done
intentionally 0 and if it would result in harm to the artist's
honor or reputation.8 ' The moral rights for a work created
after the effective date of VARA last for the author's
lifetime, 2 and in the case of joint authors, the rights last for
the life of the last surviving author.8 3
There are, however, several exceptions to the rights of
attribution and integrity included in VARA, and if a work
falls within one of these exceptions, it is not afforded moral
rights protection. 4 Modification resulting from the passage of
time or from the nature of the materials used in creating the
work will not qualify as a violation of the right of integrity. 5
service, electronic publication, or similar publication;
(ii) any merchandising item or advertising, promotional, descriptive,
covering, or packaging material or container;
(iii) any portion or part of any item described in clause (i) or (ii) ....
Id.
75. Id.
76. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2000). In the copyright context, the term "author" is a
term of art used to describe the creator of any copyrighted work, including
artistic works. See generally id.
77. Id. § 106A(a)(1)(A).
78. Id. § 106A(a)(1)(B).
79. Id. § 106A(a)(2).
80. Id. § 106A(a)(3).
81. Id.
82. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d).
83. Id.
84. Id. § 106A(c).
85. Id. § 106A(c)(1); see also Interview with Anthony Teixeira, Sculptor, in
San Jose, Cal. (Oct. 10, 2006). If the work deteriorates because of its age,
subsequent modification will not constitute a violation of the artist's moral
rights. See Interview with Anthony Teixeira, supra. Similarly, if the work is
created using certain materials, deterioration may be unavoidable. Id. For
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Similarly, acts performed during conservation or public
presentation 86 of a work are not distortions or modifications
that are actionable under VARA unless the modification is
the result of gross negligence. Further, the rights of
attribution and integrity do not apply to reproduction,
portrayal, depiction, or any other use of an otherwise
protected work8 8 when used in connection with works that are
specifically excluded from the statute's definition of works of
visual art.8 9
While the moral rights of an author under VARA cannot
be transferred,90 they can be waived by an express written
waiver, which must specify the work and uses of that work
that are waived.91 In a joint work, a single author may waive
the rights of all authors.92
2. Additional Limitations to VARA Application
In addition to the limitations on the types of works
protected and the rights provided, VARA also contains a
complex system for the removal of a work from a building,93
which limits the moral rights protection that will be granted
to certain artists, such as muralists. This area of legislation
takes into consideration the amount of potential harm to the
work, notice requirements, and the nature and date of the
original agreement. 94
VARA also contains preemption provisions similar to
other federal laws requiring state laws to yield to their
example, bronze sculptures will typically discolor based on the environment
where they are placed. Id. A bronze sculpture placed near the sea will often
turn green because of the salt in the air, while a bronze sculpture placed in the
desert may discolor based on different atmospheric conditions. Id. Likewise, a
painting placed in sunlight may fade over time. Id.
86. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(2). The lighting or placement of the work is
included. Id. If, therefore, an artist believes his work should be displayed in a
particular manner and the purchaser displays it in a different manner, or with
different lighting, there is no violation of the artist's VARA rights based on the
conservation and public presentation of the work. See id.
87. Id.
88. Id. § 106A(c)(3).
89. Id.
90. Id. § 106A(e)(1).
91. Id.
92. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(1).
93. See id. § 113(d).
94. See id.
656 [Vol: 47
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federal counterparts.95 However, any rights which are not
equivalent to VARA, or that extend beyond the lifetime of the
author, are not preempted. 6 Therefore, protection for the
artist may be strengthened or weakened based upon the
location of the work and that state's applicable laws. 9
3. Available Remedies Under VARA
While normal civil remedies for copyright infringement
are available to an artist suing under VARA,9 s the criminal
penalties of copyright law are generally not available.9 The
rights in VARA, like all rights under copyright law, are
limited by the fair use doctrine, which allows for the use of
copyrighted material in specific contexts, such as educational
purposes.' 00
4. Providing a Violation of VARA
In order to prove a violation under VARA, the artist must
first demonstrate that the work is included in one of the
categories that receives protection under the statute.01 After
this initial hurdle is met, the artist must prove the work is of
"recognized stature."102 While the term "recognized stature"
95. Id. § 301(f)(1) ("On or after the effective date .. .of the Visual Artists
Rights Act of 1990... all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of
the rights conferred by section 106A with respect to works of visual art to which
the rights conferred by section 106A apply are governed exclusively by section
106A... [Tihereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right
in any work of visual art under the common law or statutes of any state.").
96. Id.
97. See Joseph Zuber, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990-What it Does,
and What it Preempts, 23 PAC. L.J. 445 (1992).
98. See 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (defining anyone who violates the rights of an
author under the VARA as an "infringer" for the purposes of copyright law).
Generally, anyone who infringes may be liable for damages to the copyright
owner. See id. § 504(a).
99. Id. § 506(f). The criminal penalties section of copyright law states:
"Nothing in this section applies to infringement of the rights conferred by
section 106A(a)." Id. Section 106A(a) delineates the moral rights an artist can
claim, including the rights of attribution and integrity. See supra Part II.C. 1.
100. 17 U.S.C. § 107. The fair use doctrine provides that "the fair use of a
copyrighted work .. .for purposes such as criticism, comment, new reporting,
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research,
is not an infringement of copyright." Id.
101. See id. § 101; see also supra note 73.
102. Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev'd
in part, 71 F.3d 77 (1995). The artist only needs to meet the recognized stature
requirement if the work is destroyed. If the work is mutilated or otherwise
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is not defined in the statute itself, case law has created a
definition which considers whether the work has merit, and
whether it is recognized as being meritorious by members of
society. 10 3 Case law has demonstrated that the decision of
whether or not to admit evidence supporting an artist's claim
that his work is of recognized stature is made solely at the
discretion of the judge on a case-by-case basis."°4 This
discretion may cause emerging artists to suffer due to a lack
of recognized stature within the artistic community-a status
that may only come years later.'0 5
III. THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT CURRENTLY COMPLY WITH
THE BERNE CONVENTION
VARA did not bring the United States into full
compliance with the Berne Convention, nor did it meet the
international legal community's goal of protecting the moral
rights of artists. Statements made by members of Congress
at the time the United States joined the Berne Convention
show that the majority of American lawmakers believed
existing laws were sufficient to protect the moral rights of
artists, and therefore no additional law was needed. 10 6 VARA
was enacted despite this belief, but the resulting statute is a
stunted attempt to adhere to international expectations
generated when the United States agreed to accept the terms
of the Berne Convention.' 7
Since its enactment in 1990, only one artist has
successfully litigated a VARA lawsuit.'018 All other artists
attempting to exercise their moral rights under the
protections provided by VARA have lost their suits.10 9 This
surely cannot be the protection that the international
community intended to implement by including Article 6 bis
in the Berne Convention and requiring adherence to that
modified, but not destroyed, this element need not be proven. Id.
103. See id.; see also infra Part IV.A (delineating the test and the reasoning
of the court in Carter).
104. Carter, 861 F. Supp. at 325.
105. See Natalia Thurston, Buyer Beware: The Unexpected Consequences of
the Visual Artists Rights Act, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 701, 715 (2005).
106. See supra notes 35-49 and accompanying text.
107. See supra Part II.A.
108. See infra Part IV.A.2. This is the only reported case that documents a
success, although there may be unreported successes.
109. See infra Part IV.A.1.
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section as a prerequisite of joining. 110 Due to its numerous
limitations and exceptions, VARA prevents artists from
receiving protection for their moral rights, demonstrating the
United States' failure to comply with the Berne Convention.
The United States is a common law country that relies
primarily on the utilitarian view of copyright, instead of the.
natural right theory that many civil law countries employ."'
Because civil law countries initially developed moral rights
theory and legislation, some of the difficulty in creating
adequate legislation in the United States may stem from the
differing views of copyright between the civil and common law
countries." 2 However, a compromise can be made that will
allow the United States to continue its utilitarian tradition,
while also protecting the moral rights of artists as the Berne
Convention was intended to do." 3
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Moral Rights Cases After the Implementation of VARA
Although many cases have been decided since VARA's
implementation, the majority have been resolved unfavorably
for the artists. The opinions in these cases largely
demonstrate the problems with the statute, and the difficulty
of success under the current statutory regime. The sole
published success under VARA to date is indicative of the
limited moral rights protections currently afforded to artists.
1. Failures Under VARA
While cases asserting VARA claims are common, very
few artists have actually succeeded on such grounds. In fact,
there is only one published opinion to date where an artist
was awarded damages on a VARA claim." 4 This might be
due to the inherent limitations in the VARA statute."5 It is
110. Despite the intentions of the international community, the United
States made sure Article 6 bis would not be enforced against it if it chose not to
comply with the moral rights provision. See supra note 39 and accompanying
text.
111. See infra Part IV.C.
112. See infra Part V.
113. See infra Part V.
114. See Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 608 (7th Cir. 1999).
115. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2000).
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easy for a particular work to fall outside the allowable
protections of VARA, and therefore, not receive any rights
under the statute, because of the number of restrictions
within VARA. 116  An additional reason for the lack of
successful cases may be due to the historical reluctance of
courts to allow protection for moral rights."
7
One notable failure under VARA was the case of Pollara
v. Seymour,"' in which the court addressed the protection of a
work that was primarily promotional in nature. Pollara was
commissioned by the Gideon Coalition, a non-profit legal
service, to create a banner for an information table." 9 The
finished banner was ten feet by thirty feet long, and depicted
a group of people of different ethnicities engaged in an effort
to obtain legal services.2' Gideon failed to obtain a permit for
Pollara to install the banner in a building and to leave it
overnight, and the building manager had his workers remove
it. 121 In the process of removal, the banner was torn into
three parts and left crumpled in the manager's office, giving
rise to Pollara's VARA claim.
122
In analyzing the claim under VARA, the Second Circuit
denied Pollara protection because the work fell into one of the
statutory exceptions to works of visual art. 123 The court noted
that VARA did not protect works that advertise or promote,
and determined that the work in question constituted
advertising material under the copyright statute, as the goal
of the banner was to draw attention to Gideon.'24 Pollara
argued that although her work was commissioned by a
political group, she used traditional painting materials and
that the text of the banner did not detract from the artistic
116. See supra note 74.
117. See supra Part II.B.
118. Pollara v. Seymour, 344 F.3d 265 (2d Cir. 2003).
119. Id. at 266.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 267.
122. Id. Pollara claimed destruction of her work under VARA, and also
claimed a violation of her First Amendment rights. Id. The First Amendment
argument is not addressed here, as it is not probative of the result of the VARA
claim. Id.
123. Id.
124. Pollara, 344 F.3d at 268-69. The statute specifically excludes "any
merchandising item or advertising, promotional, descriptive, covering, or
packaging material or container" from being categorized as a work of visual art.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
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merit of her work.12 5 The court rejected this argument and
pointed out that while the banner was visually appealing, it
was not within the realm of the court to judge artistic merit,
but only to decide whether it fell within one of VARA's
protected categories. 26 Therefore, the court held that the
work was inherently promotional in nature and could not be
protected under VARA. 127
The first real substantive look at VARA occurred in
Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc.,128 a case involving a sculptural
work installed in a building lobby.129 The plaintiffs entered
into a contract with the managing agent of the building's
tenant in December 1991 to design a sculpture for the lobby
of the building.130 In early 1994, the tenant's lease was
terminated when the leasing company filed for bankruptcy.1
3
'
Defendant Helmsley-Spear, Inc. became the managing agent,
and barred the plaintiffs from the property shortly thereafter
because it did not approve of the sculpture in the lobby.132
Plaintiffs claimed a violation of VARA. 33 The defendants
responded by stating that the work could not be protected by
VARA because: (1) the work was not a protected work of
visual art;14 (2) the work was made for hire, and therefore,
was not protected under the provisions of VARA; 35 (3) there
would be no damage to the plaintiffs honor or reputation if
the work was distorted, mutilated, or modified;'36 and (4) the
work was not of recognized stature, and could therefore be
destroyed.137  The court, trying the case without a jury,
addressed each of the issues independently. The resulting
decision contained a complete analysis of the merits of the
case at hand, and also provided a step-by-step guide to
analyzing a case under VARA.
125. Pollara, 344 F.3d at 270.
126. Id. at 271; see also Christine Haight Farley, Judging Art, 79 TUL. L.
REV. 805 (2005) (discussing the role ofjudges in determining artistic merit).
127. Pollara, 344 F.3d at 270.
128. Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
129. Id. at 312.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 313.
132. See id.
133. Id.
134. Carter, 861 F. Supp. at 314-15.
135. Id. at 316-17.
136. Id. at 323-24.
137. Id. at 324-26.
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The defendants' first argument for excluding the work
from the protections of VARA was based on the fact that the
work incorporated elements of applied art. 3 ' The court found
that while the work had some elements and methods
traditionally used to create applied art,139 the work as a whole
was not applied art.1 40 It held that VARA did not prohibit
protection for "works of visual art that incorporate[d]
elements of, rather than constitute, applied art."'4 '
In determining whether the work was a work made for
hire, and therefore, excluded from protection under VARA,
the district court weighed the "Aymes factors "142 in order to
determine whether the plaintiffs were employees or
independent contractors. The court found that the artists had
complete artistic freedom,14 3 their work required great skill, 4 4
and that the defendants had the right through the contract to
assign other related projects to the artists.1 4  Those factors
weighed in favor of finding the artists to be independent
contractors. However, the tax treatment of the artists
weighed in favor of a finding that they were employees,
because they were given health benefits and provided with W-
2 forms. 4  Despite the tax treatment factor, the court found
the factors as a whole weighed in favor of a finding that the
artists were independent contractors, and the work therefore
could not be considered a work for hire. 47
The court next analyzed whether the work should be
protected from mutilation, distortion, or modification under
138. Id. at 315. Applied art involves two-dimensional and three-dimensional
"ornamentation or decoration" attached to utilitarian objects. Id. Applied art is
excluded from VARA protection. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
139. Carter, 861 F. Supp. at 315-16. In particular, the work was made out of
scrap materials, including a giant hand crafted from an old school bus. Id.
140. Id. at 315-16.
141. Id. at 315.
142. See id. at 317-23. The "Aymes factors" utilized by the court to determine
whether a work is made for hire are: the right to control the manner and means
of production, requisite skill, provision of employee benefits, tax treatment of
the hired party, and whether the hired party may be assigned additional
projects. Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 860 (2d Cir. 1992).
143. Carter, 861 F. Supp. at 318.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 319.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 322. This finding was later reversed on appeal. See supra note
163 and accompanying text.
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VARA. 48 The statute provides the author with these rights
only when the alteration of the work would be prejudicial to
the author's honor or reputation.149 Because the statute did
not define "prejudicial," "honor," or "reputation," the court
looked to the plain meaning of the statute. 10 The court
interpreted the statutory language to require a determination
of "whether such alteration would cause injury or damage to
plaintiffs' good name, public esteem, or reputation in the
artistic community."15' There was no requirement that the
artist's reputation be derived independently from the work at
issue; therefore, an artist's reputation could be based solely
on the work at issue in the litigation.' 2 The court weighed
the evidence and decided that the destruction of the work
would damage the plaintiffs' honor and reputation. 153
Next, the court looked to whether the work was protected
from destruction under VARA.15 4 The statute provided that a
work must be of "recognized stature" to be protected from
destruction, but again, this term was not defined. 55  The
court found that a plaintiff must satisfy a two-part test for
their work to qualify as a work of recognized stature.156 The
plaintiff must show: "(1) that the visual art in question has
'stature,' i.e. is viewed as meritorious; and (2) that this
stature is recognized by experts, other members of the artistic
community, or by some cross-section of society.' 57 The court
made clear that the recognized stature need not be on a level
with famous artists.58  The court again sided with the
plaintiff, finding that this work was one of recognized
stature.
15 9
148. Id. at 323-24.
149. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(2) (2000).
150. Carter, 861 F. Supp. at 323.
151. Id.
152. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 101-514, at 15 (1990), as reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6918).
153. Id. at 324.
154. Id. at 324-26.
155. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B) (2000).
156. Carter, 861 F. Supp. at 325.
157. Id.
158. Id. ("A plaintiff need not demonstrate that his or her art work is equal
in stature to that created by artists such as Picasso, Chagall, or Giacometti.").
159. Id. at 325-26. In finding the work was of recognized stature, the court
credited the testimony of a number of experts. Id. Two professors who claimed
the work was "exciting" testified that the work was of recognized stature. Id.
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The court held that the plaintiffs were entitled to an
injunction to prevent the distortion, mutilation, modification,
or destruction of the work.160  Additionally, the court ruled
that the work could not be removed from the building since
portions of it would be destroyed if it were removed.
161
Despite the plaintiffs initial success, upon review by the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the decision of the
lower court was reversed. 162  The Court of Appeals held,
contrary to the district court's opinion, that the multiple
factors weighed in favor of a finding that the sculpture
constituted a work for hire, 163 placing the artist's creation
under the work for hire exception, and eliminating the
protections of VARA. 164  While the portion of the district
court's decision granting the injunction was vacated, the
lower court's reasoning is still applicable in analyzing the
various facets of VARA protection, as the Second Circuit's
holding is confined to the application of the work for hire
One of these professors, Professor Darroll, explained a specific process that he
used to determine if a work has stature, and the court accepted this process and
conclusion about the work without repeating the process. Id. Also called as an
expert was Kent Barwick, President of the Municipal Art Society of New York,
who claimed, among other things, that the work was one of the "great spaces of
New York." Id. Utilizing this expert testimony, the court concluded the work
was one of recognized stature. Id.
160. Id. at 329.
161. Id. A work of visual art incorporated into a building after the effective
date of VARA may not be removed if doing so would result in the "destruction,
mutilation, distortion, or other modification of the work," unless such removal is
agreed to in writing by the building owner and the artist. 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(1)
(2000).
162. See Carter, 71 F.3d at 88.
163. Id. at 86-87. The court found the artists controlled the work's "manner
and means" and that the artists also had the requisite skill and control over the
work, both of which weighed against a work for hire status. Id. However, the
court went on to show that the artists were routinely assigned other projects in
the building, meaning they were hired to perform work other than the
sculpture. Id. This weighed in favor of a finding that the artists were not
independent contractors, but employees. Id. Further, the court found that the
defendants paid payroll and social security taxes, provided employee benefits,
and contributed to unemployment insurance on the artists' behalf. Id.
Additionally, the artists filed for unemployment benefits after their positions
were terminated, listing the building's management company as their former
employer. Id. The artists were also provided with many of the supplies used to
complete the sculpture. Id. When the court weighed all of these factors, it
determined that the artists were employees. Id.
164. Id. at 88.
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doctrine. 165
The work for hire exception, as applied in Carter, has
some very real problems in practical application. Often, in
order to create his or her work, an artist will be forced to sign
a contract which provides that the work will be considered a
work for hire.166 Because of this contractual language, an
artist may be required to effectively give up his or her moral
rights, since the contract is strong evidence that the work was
made for hire and therefore exempted from protection under
VARA. This exception is easily molded to fit any definition
that a court chooses to apply, and can be used in many
circumstances to find that the work was made by an
employee, and not an independent contractor.
Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate167  established a
standard for the types of works protected under VARA, as
well as under the Massachusetts Art Preservation Act
(MAPA)."65 In 1999, David Phillips was commissioned to
create sculptures for a park in Boston. 69 Pursuant to two
written agreements, Phillips created fifteen abstract
sculptures and twelve realistic marine-themed bronze
sculptures of animals including crabs, shrimps, and frogs. 70
Additionally, Phillips created paths connecting the sculptures
using granite, and worked with stonemasons to create
"Chords," a large, abstract sculpture that was the centerpiece
of the park.171
In 2001, Pembroke Real Estate hired another landscape
artist to re-design the park based on perceived conceptual
problems with the park. 7 2  Phillips sought a temporary
restraining order to prevent the removal and relocation of his
165. See id.
166. Interview with M.J. Bogatin, Visual Artists Rights Attorney, Bogatin,
Corman & Gold, in Oakland, Cal. (Jan. 10, 2006).
167. Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 288 F. Supp. 2d 89 (D. Mass.
2003), certified question answered by 819 N.E.2d 579 (Mass. 2004), affd, 459
F.3d 128 (1st Cir. 2006).
168. Id. at 96-103; see also Massachusetts Art Preservation Act, ch. 488, § 1,
1984 Stat. (codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85S (West Supp. 1993)).
169. Phillips, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 94.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 93-94.
172. Id. at 94. Specifically, Pembroke wanted more plants for shade and
simplified walkways. It additionally wanted to replace the river rock, which
turned out to be a maintenance problem. Id.
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sculptures. 173 He claimed that his sculptures and stonework
were site-specific, 174 and that they collectively formed one
work of visual art that should be protected under VARA, or
alternatively, under the similar Massachusetts statute,
MAPA.175
The Massachusetts district court engaged in a thorough
analysis of the provisions of VARA,'76 and denied Phillips any
sort of protection because the work as a whole did not fall
within one of the definitions of visual art set forth in the
copyright statute. 177 The district court rejected the idea that
the works were all integrated. 17 Instead, the court reasoned
that the marine sculptures might qualify as a single work
because of the integrated marine theme and recurring spirals
of those specific sculptures, as well as the use of marine
granite boulders and pavers. 179  The court found, however,
that the remaining sculptures, including the "whimsical sea
creatures" that were not a part of the northwest to southwest
axis of the park, were individual pieces.18 0  The court held
that VARA may protect site-specific art, but the works in
question fell under the public presentation exception in
VARA, and therefore, Pembroke had a right to move the
sculptures at any time.'8 1
The court construed protection under VARA narrowly, 8 2
reasoning that since some of the works were created not by
Phillips himself, but merely under his direction,181 the pieces
173. Id. at 95.
174. See id. The artist claimed that his work was created for a specific site,
and to take the work out of the site would be to destroy its meaning by taking it
out of context. Id.
175. Phillips, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 92, 97.
176. Id. at 96-100.
177. Id. at 98-99. For a full list of works protected under VARA, see supra
note 73.
178. Phillips, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 98.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 98. The court decided that some of the sculptures matched the
idea of an integrated theme-namely, the sea creatures. Id. However, it
decided that the remaining sculptures did not fit with an overall theme. Id. at
98-99. Because of this, the entire park, with all of its works, could not be
considered one complete work. Id. This is how the court was able to deny
protection in this case to individual works, since they were not all part of one
theme. Id. at 98.
181. Id. at 99-100.
182. Id. at 99.
183. Id.
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could not be seen as a unitary whole.'" However, the court
failed to understand the industry standard regarding art
assistants. It is customary in the art world for a well-known,
highly respected artist like Phillips to hire associate artists to
complete much of the physical labor that goes into the
resulting piece of art.185  The artist himself creates the
concept and initial production ideas, assists throughout the
process, and maintains the artistic credit for the work.'86 The
Massachusetts court that heard Phillips's case, however, did
not understand this commonly practiced methodology, and
consequently issued a holding which ultimately harmed
Phillips. Since Phillips did not individually create each
specific piece in the park, the court felt justified in applying
the defendant's proffered exception.
8 7
Under MAPA, the definition of visual art is broader than
under VARA; l8 8 therefore the court held that the state law
was not preempted by VARA.1 9 The district court concluded
that the requirements under MAPA were satisfied, and that
the site-specific work was a work of recognized quality.'9 ° It
further found that Phillips was an artist of international
reputation and had won numerous commissions, been
exhibited in galleries, and featured in art magazines based on
his site-specific work.' 9 ' The district court held that the
removal or destruction of Phillips' work would necessarily
damage his reputation as an artist, and was therefore
prohibited under MAPA. 92
184. Phillips, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 99.
185. Interview with David Middlebrook, public artist and sculptor, in Los
Altos, Cal. (Apr. 14, 2006).
186. Id.
187. Phillips, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 99-100.
188. Id. at 100-01. The definition of visual art is much broader in MAPA
than in VARA. Id. In particular, MAPA's "fine art" definition is more
expansive than the "visual art" defined in VARA, and includes art forms not
covered by VARA, such as holograms, videotapes, audiotapes, and films. Id.
Under the broader MAPA definition, the court held that the park could be
considered a work of fine art, even though a park does not meet the definitions
of visual art under VARA. Id.
189. Id. Because the preemption statute in copyright law only applies if the
protections offered under the state statute are the same as those offered under
the copyright provisions, MAPA is not preempted by VARA since the statutory
definitions of protected works are different. Id.
190. See id. at 101-03.
191. Id. at 103.
192. Id. at 104.
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Phillips was recently reviewed by the First Circuit Court
of Appeals,193 which affirmed the decision of the district court
on different grounds.19 4  The court of appeals declared that
site-specific art is not included in VARA, and is therefore,
contrary to the district court's conclusion, unprotected under
federal law. 9 ' The court drew upon the plain language of
VARA in determining that site-specific art is not protected,
because the phrase "site-specific" is not included anywhere in
the statute.196 The first district indicated that in order for
site-specific work to be protected under VARA, not only would
the phrase itself need to be included, but the statute would
also have to include an "elaboration of how to differentiate
between site-specific and non-site-specific art."'97  The
dichotomy introduced by the district court-that VARA
protects site-specific art and then permits its destruction or
removal through the public presentation exception-was
overruled by the court of appeals, which held instead that
VARA does not protect site-specific work at all. 19
8
The lower court in Phillips allowed the application of the
public presentation exception because it concluded that the
work was not a single piece of art, due to Phillips' use of
assistants.199 Despite a strikingly similar factual scenario,
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reached the opposite
conclusion in Carter.'00 There, the court found that the
artists used assistants in creating the works, but that the use
of assistants was immaterial to their status as the artists and
193. Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 459 F.3d 128 (1st Cir. 2006).
194. Id. at 129.
195. Id. at 140 ("By concluding that VARA applies to site-specific art and
then allowing the removal of site-specific art pursuant to the public
presentation exception, the district court purports to protect site-specific art
under VARA's general provisions, and then permit its destruction by the
application of one of VARA's exceptions. To us, this is not a sensible reading of
VARA's plain meaning. Either VARA recognizes site-specific art and protects it,
or it does not recognize site-specific art at all.").
196. Id. at 143.
197. Id. at 142.
198. Id. at 143. The court left room for future protection of site-specific art
by Congress, stating: "If such protection is necessary, Congress should do the
job. We cannot do it by rewriting the statute in the guise of statutory
interpretation." Id.
199. Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 288 F. Supp. 2d 89, 99 (D. Mass.
2003).
200. Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77 (1995).
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creators of the work.2°' The court stated that the
"[a]ppellants' contention that the plaintiffs' reliance on
assistants in some way mitigates the skill required for this
work is meritless, particularly because each of the plaintiffs is
a professional sculptor and the parties stipulated that
professional sculpting is a highly skilled occupation. 2 2 This
dichotomy in reasoning is an example of the problem with
varying standards in the application of moral rights
legislation.
2. Success Under VARA
In Martin v. City of Indianapolis,2 °3 the first published
successful protection of an artist's moral rights under VARA,
the Seventh Circuit clearly defined the necessary elements of
a successful VARA claim. In the case, Martin, the plaintiff,
was a sculptor who had been contracted to erect a twenty-by-
forty foot metal sculpture on land owned by John LaFollette,
the chairman of the company that hired Martin to create the
sculpture.20 4 LaFollette's company agreed to furnish the
materials for the sculpture, 20 5 and the parties contracted that
if the land was sold or determined to be unfit for the
sculpture at any time in the future, LaFollette and Martin
would be given written notice giving them ninety days to
remove the sculpture.2 6
Six years after the completion of the sculpture,2 7 the city
notified LaFollette that there would be hearings held on the
acquisition of the land.20 8 Kim Martin, the artist's brother
and president of the company that hired Martin, reminded
the city that the company paid for the sculpture and signed
201. See id. at 86.
202. Id.
203. Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 608 (1999).
204. Id. at 610.
205. Id.
206. Id. The agreement provided:
Should a determination be made by the Department of Metropolitan
Development that the subject sculpture is no longer compatible with the
existing land use or that the acquisition of the property is necessary, the owner
of the land and the owner of the sculpture will receive written notice signed by
the Director of the Department of Metropolitan Development giving the owners
of the land and sculpture ninety (90) days to remove said sculpture.
Id.
207. Id. at 611.
208. Id. at 610.
2007] 669
670 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol: 47
an agreement with the Department of Metropolitan
Development regarding the possible removal of the
sculpture.20 9  The company was willing to donate the
sculpture to the city if the city bore the costs of removal, as
long as the artist had some input as to the new location of the
piece.210 The city purchased the land,21' and despite plaintiffs
repeated proposals, 2 2  demolished the sculpture without
notice to either the artist or company.213
Martin claimed a violation of his rights under VARA.214
The court analyzed the subject of "recognized stature" using
the analysis of the court in Carter as a model. 215 The court
analyzed the evidence Martin presented to determine that the
work was of recognized stature,216 and ultimately decided that
the destruction of Martin's sculpture was a violation of his
rights under VARA.217  Martin's sculpture fit all the
requirements of VARA,218 and there was no valid waiver of
his rights.21 9  The court found the city to be at fault for




213. Id. The company made repeated efforts to contact the mayor, and other
city officials. Id. The artist himself repeated the proposal to move the piece at
the hearings, and wrote a letter to the mayor reiterating this proposal. Id.
Each time the proposal was mentioned, the contract was also mentioned,
clarifying a 90-day notice requirement. Id. Despite these efforts, the sculpture
was demolished, leaving the court to claim, "[b]ureaucratic ineptitude may be
the only explanation." See id. at 614.
214. Id. at 610. The original lawsuit resulted in summary judgment for the
plaintiff, however, neither party was satisfied with this decision, and both
appealed. Id.
215. Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 303, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
The two-part analysis consisted of the following determinations: "(1) that the
visual art in question has 'stature,' i.e. is viewed as meritorious, and (2) that
this stature is 'recognized' by art experts, other members of the artistic
community, or by some cross-section of society." Id.
216. See Martin, 192 F.3d at 612. Martin produced newspaper and magazine
articles, a letter from a gallery director, and a program from a show where the
sculpture won "Best in Show." Id.
217. Id.
218. See id.
219. Id. at 614 ("Under 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(1), an artist may waive VARA
rights 'in a written instrument signed by the author,' specifying to what the
waiver applies. There is no written waiver instrument in this case which falls
within the VARA requirements. We regard this argument to be without
merit.").
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destroying the work without giving Martin adequate notice.220
However, it also found that the city's actions did not
constitute "willful" conduct under VARA, so the plaintiff was
not entitled to enhanced damages.2 21 Despite the damages
portion of the opinion, Martin remains a strong case in
support of moral rights legislation.
B. Further Problems with Undefined Terms in VARA
VARA allows an artist the right to prevent any
distortion, mutilation or modification of his or her art that
would be "prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation."222
Congress's failure to create a clear definition of these terms
has led the courts to use the generally accepted dictionary
definitions of these terms, with the term "prejudicial"
typically meaning "harmful."223 Because of the confusion as
to what these terms actually mean, different courts may
create different holdings for the same factual situation, which
may cause an artist to lose protection.
Additionally, VARA does not define the term "recognized
stature. 224  Because an author can only prevent the
destruction of a work of recognized stature, this term is vital
to the level of protection an author may receive under VARA.
The best definition of this term to date is the two-part test the
court enumerated in Carter.225
C. Varying Standards Surrounding Copyright Protection
Part of the problem in awarding moral rights to a
claimant under VARA is the dichotomy between moral rights
as viewed in America and abroad. The international
standard is largely focused on protecting all moral rights of
220. Id. at 614.
221. Id. ("In spite of the City's conduct resulting in the intentional
destruction of the sculpture, we do not believe under all the circumstances...
that the City's conduct was 'willful' as used in VARA . . . so as to entitle the
plaintiff to enhanced damages."). Even in the plaintiffs victory, the Seventh
Circuit belittled the destruction of the sculpture. See id. The traditional view of
courts not awarding artists moral rights is perpetuated even in this successful
decision. See id.
222. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A) (2000).
223. See Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 303, 323 (S.D.N.Y.
1994).
224. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B).
225. See supra notes 156-58 and accompanying text.
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an artist 226 to the exclusion of the rights of anyone else.
Contrastingly, the American standard still demonstrates
great reluctance in awarding protection to artists, even after
the passage of VARA.227 This disparity might be attributable,
in part, to the differing belief systems and valuations of art in
various societies.
1. International Perspective
Most European countries believe in the natural rights
rhetoric of copyright.22' This theory dictates that an author
has the right to reap the fruits of his creations,229 obtain
rewards for his contributions to society,230 and protect the
integrity of his creations as extensions of his personality.231
This final phrase precisely encompasses the concept of moral
rights.232 If an author has an inherent right to protect the
integrity of his creations, and if every work is an extension of
that artist's personality, then the work should be awarded the
rights of attribution and integrity, which form the foundation
for moral rights protection. This view is prominent in many
countries across the globe,233 and does not apply only to moral
rights, but to copyright protection as a whole.234 These
international forums were the pioneers of moral rights
legislation, and retain the highest protection for authors and
artists .235
2. Domestic Perspective
In contrast to the international view, the American view
has primarily been one of utilitarianism,236 a theory based
226. See CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 59 (Matthew Bender & Co.,
6th ed. 2003).
227. See supra Part IV.A.1.




232. Id. Moral rights were designed to protect the integrity of an artist's
creations, as defined in the natural rights theory of copyright. Id.
233. See infra Parts IV.D-E.
234. See JOYCE ETAL., supra note 226, at 60-61.
235. See supra note 25. This was part of the impetus behind the
implementation of the Berne Convention and particularly Article 6 bis. Id. The
international community wanted to protect the artists and their works. Id.
236. See JOYCE ET AL., supra note 226, at 56-57.
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largely on economics.237 The basic premise of utilitarianism is
that an artist needs financial incentives to bring his work to
market.2 38 If an artist is not provided with these incentives,
often in the form of legal protection, he might not produce as
much art, which would be detrimental to society as a whole.239
Because of this approach, American theory has always been
an economic trade-off between encouraging production of
works through legal incentives and restricting their scope
through limiting doctrines, such as the doctrines of
originality2 0 and fair use.241 This view does not allow much
room for the protection of an artist's moral rights. The main
goal of utilitarianism, and to a large extent, of American
copyright law, has been to encourage the creation and
dissemination of artistic works to the marketplace.242 While
this goal is aided by legal protections, such protections are
only strong enough to encourage creation,243 due to the limits
placed on the amount of rights an artist can actually claim. 2"
The law in the United States has always been structured
to give artists very limited working room. The structure
allows an artist just enough incentive to create, but prevents
him or her from having enough rights to create a monopoly in
his or her works. Because of this viewpoint, courts have not
truly protected moral rights.245  Even after the
implementation of VARA, courts have been uninterested in
recognizing and applying moral rights.246
D. Dualistic v. Monistic Approach to Moral Rights
Moral rights legislation and protection first began in
237. Id. at 57.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 58. The originality requirement has been found to be a
constitutional requirement. Id. at 85. It states all that is necessary for a work
to be copyrightable is for the work to have been originally created by the author,
and have a minimal degree of creativity. Feist Publ'n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv.
Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
241. See JOYCE ET AL., supra note 226, at 58. For the full list of exceptions to
violations of copyright, see 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-122.
242. See JOYCE ET AL., supra note 226, at 58.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. See supra Part II.B.
246. See supra Part IV.A.
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Europe.247 The originator of moral rights, France, has well-
established legislation on the subject, which can assist
countries like the United States in analyzing their own moral
rights legislation, and serve as a check on their compliance
with the Berne Convention as well as other international
standards of protection. Many European countries have a
long-standing tradition of protecting the moral rights of
artists,2 4 and the similarities and differences among their
laws are also instructive. In the countries that originated
moral rights protection, there are generally two separate
views of the protection, dualism and monism.
1. Dualism
The dualistic perspective on moral rights is best
exemplified by the French Copyright Code.2 49 This view of
moral rights revolves around the fact that there are two
elements of copyright protection: the rights to the intellectual
and moral nature of the work, and the economic rights as
determined by law.250 From this perspective, an artist's moral
rights in a work are seen as separate from his or her economic
rights in the same work.251 This dualistic approach greatly
changes the way an artist can waive his or her rights in a
work, the damages he or she may receive for injury to his or
her work, and how he or she may transfer his or her rights
through succession."' Specifically, the French theory
provides two types of copyright protection: the moral rights
are considered "perpetual, inalienable, and imprescriptible"5 3
under French law, while the other rights are considered
limited in time, alienable, and subject to prescription.25 4
Another important issue internationally is the potential
247. See Dietz, supra note 29, at 201.
248. See generally id.
249. Law No. 95-597 of July 1, 1992, Le Journal Officiel de la R~publique
Franaise [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], July 3, 1992, p. 8801 (codified in
Code de la propri~t6 intellectuelle (Fr.), art. L.111-1) [hereinafter French
Copyright Act], available at
http://195.83.177.9/code/liste.phtml?lang=uk&c=36&r=2490 (last visited Feb.
10, 2007).
250. Id.
251. See Dietz, supra note 29, at 206.
252. See generally id.
253. French Copyright Act, supra note 249, at art. L.121-1.
254. Id.
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succession of moral rights. In dualistic countries, the legal
successors of the author must enforce the moral rights of the
author.255 This right is considered a functional right only,
and the successors cannot exercise it in their own personal
interests, but only to protect the work and person of the
author.256 The successors are made de facto conservators of
the moral rights of the author, but if they do not fulfill their
duties on behalf of the author, judicial intervention is often
permitted.257
2. Monism
Monism, in contrast, is the view that copyright as a
whole protects the intellectual, moral and economic rights of
artists.25  Germany best exemplifies this view by stating in
its copyright code that copyright "shall protect the author
with respect to his intellectual and personal relationship with
his work, and also with respect to utilization of his work."25 9
The monistic view would therefore view the moral right as
one right of many the author receives in copyright.260
Monistic countries typically allow for the succession of
moral rights only by testamentary disposition, and not by
absolute right.261 The entire copyright, including its economic
and moral rights, is passed to successors due to the monistic
view that a copyright is a single thing, and does not include
separate rights at all.262 In addition, the legal successors are
able to exercise the moral rights protection as they see fit,
even if doing so is in their own interests.263 Of course, the
successors will usually act in the best interests of the author,
255. See Dietz, supra note 29, at 217. This right exists in France, Belgium,
Italy, and Spain. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.; see also French Copyright Act, supra note 249, at art. L.121-3
(authorizing the court to issue orders in cases of manifest abuse in the exercise
or non-exercise of the right of disclosure by a deceased author's representatives
and permitting the government to refer cases to the courts).
258. See Dietz, supra note 29, at 207.
259. Urheberrechtgesetz [Law Dealing with Copyright and Neighboring
Rights], Sept. 9, 1965, BGB1. I at 1273, art. 11 [hereinafter German Copyright
Act]. available at http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs-new/en/de/de007en.html (last
visited Feb. 10, 2007).
260. See Dietz, supra note 29, at 208-09.
261. See id. at 218.
262. See supra notes 259-60 and accompanying text.
263. See Dietz, supra note 29, at 218.
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but in monistic countries, there is simply no check against
this power in striking contrast to the judicial intervention
present in dualistic countries.
E. Additional Rights Protected Internationally
The international community generally protects more
rights than merely those of attribution and integrity, as
provided by the Berne Convention and by VARA.2 64 Moral
rights in the international arena will typically cover the
rights of attribution, integrity, divulgation, and the right to
repent.265
Divulgation is a moral right which reserves to the author
the fundamental decision of when and how to release his
work from the private sphere, and expose it to the public.2 66
This right, present in France, Spain, and Switzerland among
other countries,267 allows the author the absolute discretion to
decide when his work will enter the financial or commercial
sphere of the public.
The right to repent or withdraw is the natural corollary
to the divulgation right. This right allows the author to
withdraw his work from the public sphere whenever he
chooses.265 While this right is less developed internationally,
and there is little case law on the subject,269 it is present in
France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Belgium.2 10  There is
criticism surrounding the right to repent, since an author who
changes his convictions can simply state his new convictions
in a new work or in a public statement.27 1 However, there are
potentially extreme situations that may justify repentance,
such as where an author's social, political, or even physical
existence is at stake.272 In the event an author wishes to
invoke his right to repent, there are strict consequences for
the allowance of a removal of the work from the public
264. See supra text accompanying note 33.
265. See generally Dietz, supra note 29.
266. See id. at 204.
267. See id. at 203-04.
268. See id. at 205.
269. Id.
270. Id. Currently, the right is only believed to exist in Belgium, which
traditionally adheres to French copyright practices. Id.
271. Dietz, supra note 29, at 205.
272. Id.
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sphere;2 3 thus, the right is seldom invoked internationally.
V. PROPOSAL
The United States claims to be in compliance with the
Berne Convention and with international standards of moral
rights protection, but case law demonstrates that VARA is
inadequate in this regard.274 For the United States to fully
comply with the Berne Convention and the international
standards it stands for, the moral rights legislation in the
United States must be aligned with that of countries with
well-developed moral rights protection. By amending VARA
to include key provisions of successful international moral
rights legislation, the United States will be closer to
international standards, and American artists will be better
protected.
Many of the countries with established moral rights
legislation are civil law countries, which the United States
should emulate in redrafting moral rights protection for
American artists. The differences between a common law
country, like the United States, and a civil law country are
largely those of viewpoint-natural right vs. utilitarian
theories.27 5 There is sufficient room in American copyright
law for the United States to adopt some of the civil law
legislation on moral rights, and adapt it if necessary.
The United States should follow the dualistic viewpoint
of moral rights legislation as pioneered by France, and not
necessarily the monistic viewpoint preferred by Germany and
others.276 The dualist view is much more aligned with the
United States' current system of copyrights, allowing for a far
more fluid adaptation than would be possible under a
monistic view. The dualistic perspective that copyright
contains protections for two separate rights-economic rights
on the one hand and moral rights on the other hand-fits in
much more neatly with our history of protecting only
273. See id. Dietz mentions only one consequence in particular-the
obligation to compensate the relevant work users in advance. Id. This
consequence of invoking the right to repent is present in France, Germany,
Italy, and Spain. Id.
274. See supra Part IV.A.
275. See supra Part IV.C.
276. See supra Part IV.D.
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economic rights in the United States.277 Since moral rights
were not protected in the United States at all until VARA was
passed in 1990, it would be difficult to force our society to
conform to a monistic view that copyright is one system,
encompassing all rights, economic and moral.
A. Additional Rights Should Be Added to VARA
The additional rights of divulgation and the right of
repent or withdrawal are prevalent in the international
community.27 Adding the protection of these rights to the
American copyright system will further advance our
utilitarian goals. The current perspective in America is that
copyright is designed to encourage creation, and to encourage
the dissemination of works to the public. 7 9 These rights will
help authors create because their works will be better
protected, giving them additional incentive to place their
works in the public market. If an author had the right to say
when his or her work would enter the commercial world, he or
she would more likely create at a time that is good for both
him or her and the public at large. For example, if authors
choose to disseminate their work at a time when the public is
demanding that particular form of art, they will likely sell
more, earning more income while simultaneously satisfying
the economic demand.
Germany can be viewed as a test market for the
divulgation right, because currently, it is automatically
granted to foreign authors in Germany, regardless of their
rights under German law.280 Therefore, an American author
can fight against an illicit publication of his work in
Germany, even if he does not have standing to defend his
rights under any other agreement or German copyright
law.281 While the United States is unlikely to extend the
divulgation right to foreign authors until its effectiveness has
been evaluated with our own copyright holders, the German
277. See supra Part II.B.
278. See supra Part IV.E.
279. See supra Part IV.C.
280. German Copyright Act, supra note 259, at art. 121(6) ("Foreign
nationals shall enjoy protection under Articles 12 to 14 [moral rights provisions]
with respect to all of their works, even if the conditions [relating to reciprocity
and treaty rights] contained in paragraphs (1) to (5) are not fulfilled.").
281. Id.
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application of the law will allow American lawmakers to see
the benefits of protecting the divulgation right.
The right to repent is less important for American
copyright law because, due to a lack of pertinent case law on
the subject, it has not proven to be a very important right in
the international community. 2 2 However, it is a natural
corollary to the divulgation right,283 and should the United
States add the divulgation right to its moral rights protection,
the right to repent should be adopted as well. Additionally,
many foreign nations have requirements for invoking the
right to repent.8 4 If American legislators are concerned that
adding the right to repent to the current moral rights
protection will encourage authors to remove works from the
marketplace, they can adopt a similar requirement to prevent
unnecessary invocations of the right.
B. Time Limit on Moral Rights
While there is much to learn from the international
community on this subject, one standard that America should
not follow is the time limit on moral rights. VARA provides
that depending on the date of creation, the moral rights of an
artist will end when his or her copyright in the work ends, or
upon the artist's death.28 5 While this is the predominant view
in monistic countries,28 6 in dualistic countries, moral rights
are often declared perpetual.2 7  France declares this
perpetual right to be in accordance with the fundamental
concept of moral rights in French law, even if other solutions,
such as a defined end to moral rights, are available or
conceivable.2 8 According to the French, the link between an
author and his or her work exists as long as the work is
capable of being communicated to the public-therefore, the
personality of the author lives as long as the work exists.28 9
282. See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
283. See supra Part IV.E.
284. See supra note 273.
285. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d) (2000).
286. See Dietz, supra note 29, at 213-16. This is also the minimum term
required by the Berne Convention. That standard requires the moral rights to
follow the economic rights of the author, whereas in the U.S., moral rights die
with the author. See Berne Convention supra note 7.
287. See Dietz, supra note 29, at 213-16.
288. Id. at 213.
289. Id.
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America does not have to allow for perpetual protection of
moral rights simply to follow the dualistic view. There is no
corollary between dualism and perpetuity, or monism and
limited-in-time protection.29 °  Each country that has
established a time limit has done so based on its individual
needs and concerns, as well as each individual country's
culture.29' The United States is much better off with a
limited time approach, such as the one contained in VARA,2 92
because it fits in with our culture and history of copyright.
The utilitarian viewpoint focuses more on the expansion of
American copyright and the public benefits of increased
knowledge and artistic works. Given its history of failing to
protect moral rights, the United States would likely balk at
any attempt to increase moral rights protection beyond that
which is presently afforded economic rights in a particular
copyrighted work.
C. Succession of Moral Rights
An important issue in international copyright legislation
is the succession of moral rights.2 93 The United States does
not currently have any rules regarding the succession of
moral rights. Due to the lack of any rule in this area, the
United States should once again take its cue from civil law
countries in creating its own legislation.
The United States should follow the monistic view in this
area and allow succession by testamentary disposition
instead of by absolute right.294 The United States places a
high value on personal property, as demonstrated by the rigid
probate system in American courts,295 and it is unlikely that
the United States will allow a right such as the moral right of
an author to be inherited without express testamentary
disposition. Once the successors are in control of the moral
right, the United States will also prefer to allow them to
exercise that right on their own, without judicial intervention
or control. If adopted, this hands-off approach of American
jurisprudence will lead to a smoother transition for both
290. Id. at 214.
291. Id. at 216.
292, 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d) (2000).
293. See Dietz, supra note 29, at 217.
294. See supra Part IV.D.2.
295. See generally UNIF. PROBATE CODE (1993).
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courts and copyright owners.
D. Waiving Moral Rights
In the United States, artists may waive their moral
rights to a work, and that waiver is considered binding.296
Often, artists lack the bargaining power to change this,
resulting in artists not receiving their moral rights when they
should.297 The United States should follow the international
solution for allowing waiver in limited circumstances so as to
provide the strongest possible moral rights protection. There
is no uniform provision in international law for waiving the
right of attribution.298  The Netherlands never allows a
waiver of this right,299 whereas Denmark, Switzerland, and
Germany allow waiver only in certain circumstances. °0
While the United States should develop its own provision
regarding the waiver of the attribution right, initially, it
should follow the example set forth in Denmark, Switzerland,
and Germany, allowing waiver only under specified
circumstances. A balancing test is a good way for legislators,
the judiciary, and artists themselves to determine when a
waiver will be effective. This system would allow the United
States to enact some form of waiver protection that is in
between the harsh no-waiver rule of the Netherlands, and the
current rule in the United States that waiver is always
effective.
Waiver of the integrity right also varies based on the
country of copyright. France, Italy, and Spain all agree there
can be no waiver of this right, regardless of the conditions
involved,3 ' while in the United States, there must be
prejudice to the author's name or reputation for the integrity
right to attach. 02 While France criticizes the American
approach as being too narrow, it conforms with the language
contained in the Berne Convention.30 3
296. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(1).
297. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
298. See Dietz, supra note 29, at 219.
299. Id. at 220.
300. Id. Waiver may be permitted in circumstances where certain
requirements of proper usage are met, or by balancing the interests between the
artist, the person who secured the waiver, and the public. Id.
301. Id. at 221.
302. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3) (2000).
303. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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E. Solution of Undefined Terms
In the United States, VARA, protects of moral rights only
if the modification or destruction prejudices an artist's honor
or reputation.30 4 VARA also states that an artist can only
prevent the destruction to a work of recognized stature." 5
These terms have not been defined by Congress, leaving the
courts to interpret them. 6 While these provisions of VARA
may technically be in compliance with the Berne Convention,
the United States should amend its moral rights legislation,
eliminate these terms from VARA, and move closer to
international standards.
Modification of an artist's work can conflict with his or
her fundamental artistic and moral convictions without,
judging from the outside, prejudicing his honor or reputation.
Germany and Spain allow for protection when there is
prejudice to any interest under copyright, including moral
rights.30 7 This is a much better standard for protection of the
artist, and the United States should adopt a similar
approach, where the artist will be compensated regardless of
whether the moral rights violation actually prejudices his
reputation or honor. It is similarly inappropriate to require
the work to be of recognized stature before it is given moral
rights protection. Much art, especially that created by young
artists, has not had the necessary time or exposure to become
a piece of recognized stature. The elimination of this term
will allow all artists to be protected in the United States as in
the international community.
F. Narrowing the Public Presentation Exception
The public presentation exception in VARA is currently
too broad and allows for too much damage to be done to the
artist's work before a court will protect that artist's moral
rights.0 One commentator has suggested a solution under
which changes or modifications to a work that are purely
artistic or aesthetic would not be allowed, whereas changes
304. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3).
305. Id. § 106A(a)(3)(B).
306. See supra Part W.B.
307. See Dietz, supra note 29, at 222.
308. See supra Part IV.A.1; see also Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc.,
288 F. Supp. 2d 89 (D. Mass. 2003).
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that must be made due to technical, financial, or
circumstantial conditions of exploiting the work would be
permitted.30 9  By implementing this solution into American
legislation, a gallery may change the frame or lighting around
a painting as they have always done. However, they would be
unable to remove works that were created around a theme, as
the defendants did in Phillips."'°
G. Balancing Test to Determine the Extent of Protection
One final change to American moral rights legislation
would be to adopt a more flexible approach based on
balancing needs, such as the one practiced in the
international community. The United States already employs
fair use as a defense to copyright infringement.3 1 ' A similar
analysis can be applied to determine the extent of moral
rights protection, especially that of the integrity right.32 By
implementing a balancing test, no single criterion, such as
the employment relationship, would be decisive in an isolated
manner.31 3 Currently, the United States applies a work-for-
hire exception, which often denies artists' moral rights
protection for their work in an employment setting.1 4
Alternatively, a balancing test, would allow the artist to
enforce moral rights when violations of their personal rights
are at issue. This is a form of protection the United States
should provide to all of its artists.
309. Dietz, supra note 29, at 223.
310. See supra Part V.A.1.
311. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
312. See Dietz, supra note 29, at 225. A suggested test, following the fair use
analysis, would contain the following criteria:
[T]he nature and intensity of modifications of or other interference with
the work, as well as its reversible or irreversible character; the number
of people or the size of the public addressed by the use of the infringing
work; whether the author created the work in an employment
relationship or as a self-employed author, or whether a commissioning
party had or had not decisive influence onto the final result of the
creation; and the possible consequences for the professional life of the
author, and, of course, his honor and reputation.
Id.
313. See Carter v. Helmsley-Spears, Inc., 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995); see also
supra Part IV.A.1.
314. See Carter, 71 F.3d at 85; see also supra Part IV.A.1.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Visual Artists Rights Act is a great step in the right
direction for the protection of moral rights in America.
However, this legislation does not meet the international
standards that led to the enactment of the Berne Convention.
By making a few simple changes to VARA, the United States
can move closer to compliance not only with the Berne
Convention, but also with the international standards that
artists have come to expect. The art in America is just as
valuable as art abroad. It is created by artists who are just as
talented and just as passionate. American art provides the
same value to society, and evokes the same emotions in the
people who view it, while fetching just as much on the open
market as international art. It is time we treated it just as
well.
